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"After you choose the technology you
love, you have to research every system
and code everyday!"
Charles: "Silence belongs to our
world..."
Charles
"Charles always laughs so brightly when
searching for program problems!"
KuNgBiM
"Only we can feel this kind of happy..."
Ronag
"Behind every successful design, he
always has a slight smile
Wicked Rose and NCPH hacking photos
WHG (
WHG is not a core member of NCPH but a close affiliate of Wicked Rose. WHG appears to be
central to development of the NCPH rootkit, aka GinWui. WHG is credited by Wicked Rose as
one of the authors of this malicious code. WHG is an experienced malicious code author with
the following contact information:
E-mail address:
QQ Number:
Website:
Real Name:
Location:
whg@163.com
312016
http://cnasm.com
May be "Zhao Jibing",
Believed to be employed in the Sichuan province of China.
WZT is a former member of the NCPH group who was kicked out during the time of zero-day
attacks in May 2006. WZT was removed on May 20, 2006. During this time period the zeroday attacks became publicly disclosed, increasing pressure upon the hacking group. It is feasible
that WZT may have offended the group in some way related to zero-day attack techniques, strife
over hacker for hire deals, or competition for hacker for hire deals.
WZT is a former coding expert within the NCPH group and many years experience in hacking.
He is responsible for creating multiple tools and regularly giving credit to the infamous Li0n
Chinese hacker (founder of Honker Union (HUC) Chinese group. WZT maintains a website at
tthacker.cublog.cn.
The Jiangsu Connection?
WHOIS registrant data for related domains used within attacks and hacker sites reveals a
connection with the Jiangsu province of China. One domain, windowsupdates.net, is used in
attacks and revolves to an IP address in the Sichuan province. Meanwhile, the registrant
"zhaofeng network" is reportedly based out of Jiangsu, not Sichuan. Some of the WHOIS
information clearly contains fraudulent information to presumably direct researchers away from
the true identity and location of the attacker responsible for registering the hostile domain. The
connection to the Jiangsu and Sichuan provinces remains unclear.
Concluding Comments
Prior to Wicked Rose and NCPH hacker for hire attacks in 2006, Chinese hackers are only
known for their patriotic hacking. This disturbing development reveals two critical threats: 1)
motives of Chinese hackers are changing 2) Chinese hackers are regularly associated with
sophisticated attacks as of 2006.
Wicked Rose implicates himself in his early blog entries and website posts in 2006 and prior.
An unknown company or entity reportedly paid Wicked Rose for hacking at the rate of 2,000
RMB a month, about $250 USD. At this time Wicked Rose gave 200 RMB to NCPH hackers
and kept the rest for himself. Once targeted attacks took place the payment increased five-fold to
5,000 RMB monthly with $1,000 a month going to NCPH hackers. This is a significant amount
of money in China, effectively paying hackers a full-time wage for part-time hacking.
Throughout the summer of 2006, while Wicked Rose was not in school, over 35 zero-day
attacks, proof-of-concept codes, and attacks against un-patched Microsoft Office vulnerabilities
are discovered in the wild. With Wicked Rose claiming responsibility for early attacks and the
lead author of both GinWui and the NCPH hacking group, there is little doubt left as to his
involvement in attacks to date.
By the end of 2006 attacks become increasingly sophisticated. In one instance a popular
PowerPoint file distributed during the Christmas holiday season for the last two years prior is
used within a socially engineered attack upon one individual within an energy sector US based
company. The PowerPoint file is modified to include an exploit that silently installs malicious
code. This same individual receives another e-mail containing a Microsoft Word exploit. In this
case only one individual within the company is targeted, and with just two messages socially
engineered for maximum success. This is a much more targeted and stealthy approach for
attacks compared to the earlier attacks performed by the group in the late spring of 2006.
NCPH continues to be a significant threat going forth for several reasons.
1. Attacks continue to take place in the wild and are very difficult to identify on a targeted
basis. Only the most sophisticated networks and system administrators are able to
properly protect and capture hostile targeted attack files before an attack takes place.
2. NCPH is a serious dedicated hacking group that is methodical and disciplined in their
development of new exploits and attacks.
3. NCPH is motivated by both the thrill and challenge of hacking and money as a motive.
4. Attacks by the group are highly targeted and stealthy, very difficult to detect and remove.
Russian Invasion of Georgia
Russian Cyberwar on Georgia
10 November, 2008
Regular updates can be found on the Georgia Update website:
www.georgiaupdate.gov.ge
INTRODUCTION ..............................................................................................2
BACKGROUND ON CYBERWARFARE.......................................................2
RUSSIA
S ONLINE WAR ON GEORGIA: FIRST STRIKE ..............................3
CYBER BLOCKADE.........................................................................................5
SITES PROVIDING DDOS ATTACK TOOLS .................................................5
PART OF THE INFORMATION WAR .............................................................7
RUSSIAN BUSINESS NETWORK......................................................................8
THE 27 AUGUST ATTACK...............................................................................9
CONCLUSION......................................................................................................10
APPENDIX: Articles About Cyberwar on Georgia .........................................11
1. INTRODUCTION
The Russian invasion of Georgia was preceded by an intensive build up
of cyberattacks attempting to disrupt, deface and bring down critical
Georgian governmental and civilian online infrastructure. These attacks
became a massive assault on the eve of the invasion which resulted in
the blocking, re-routing of traffic and control being seized of various